This paper presents a synthesis and analysis of corporate governance guidelines of the twenty-five European Union (EU) member states. The paper focuses on observable and quantifiable aspects of corporate governance including key aspects pertaining to the composition and operation of the board of directors, audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee, and other corporate governance policies. Using an Australian corporate governance ranking system, contained in the Horwath Report, the Corporate Governance (CG) Guidelines were analysed and rated. Based on the rating system, thirteen of the twenty-five EU countries had guidelines that were considered to be lacking in several key areas. In contrast, Ireland and the United Kingdom have the most detailed and rigorous corporate governance guidelines. Countries with less developed economic frameworks have the least detailed and rigorous corporate governance guidelines. Finally the specificity of corporate governance guidelines varies greatly between the various countries either due to the system used (one or two tier systems) or whether the country's legal system is predominately common or statutory law. The aim of the paper is not to determine the compliance of individual companies on their company's CG Code but to rate the Codes of the countries so as to assess whether there ought to be stricter regulatory measures by the EU on its member states.
Introduction
While corporate governance (CG) is anything but a new area of enquiry it has taken on greater international significance since the mid 1990s due to the corporate collapses of Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat etc. An example of a nation waiting to implement CG after a corporate crisis or a stock exchange crash is Cyprus. In the 1990s while there was a boom in the stock exchange and everyone was "winning" there was no discussion of implementing a Corporate Governance Code. Once there was a crash in 1999, the Code was enforced. The United States has responded with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the European Union with the publication of the Winter Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (Maasen et al., 2003) For all countries, but particularly for countries with developing economies, international investment highlights the need to demonstrate the existence, or at least commitment, to the development of quality corporate governance practices. Respective regulatory authorities in most European Union (EU) countries have been pro-active in prescribing "best practice rules or guidelines". As Spanos (2005) states "CG has significant implications for the growth prospects of an economy. Proper CG practices diminish risk for investors, attract investment capital and improve corporate performance" (p.16). Maher and Andersson (1999) have stated that corporate governance affects the industrial competitiveness of countries due to increasing competition and capital mobility. Johnson et al. (2000) and Mitton (1999) have drawn inferences between weak corporate governance and currency crisis. It is important therefore that there is an effective corporate governance code to avoid fluctuations in the market, protect the investors and the overall country's economy. " A corporate governance rating could be a powerful indicator of the extent to which a company is currently adding, or has the potential to add in the future, to shareholder value. This is because a company with good corporate governance is generally perceived as more attractive to investors than one without" (Editorial, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2001, Vol 9, Number 4, p. 257)
Literature Review
As Solomon and Solomon (2004) state the " system of corporate governance presiding in any country is determined by a wide array of internal factors, including corporate ownership structure, the state of the economy, the legal system, government policies, culture and history" (p. 147). In addition, the same authors argue that there are also externalities such as the global economic climate, cross-border institutional investment and the extent of overseas capital inflows which too affect the corporate governance system of a country. As Prowse (1994) notes there are two main corporate governance systems, the Anglo-Saxon model 1 or the institutionally-based model 2 . Solomon et al. (2002) , and Solomon, et al. (2003) , state that for developing countries to be internationally competitive and attract foreign capital, they need to adopt "commonly accepted standards of corporate governance" (p. 235).
Countries however have unique cultural, legal and economic characteristics and therefore most countries have their own corporate governance guidelines. According to the European Corporate Governance Institute there are more than 107 codes introduced since 1992 in 35 countries and in Europe alone more than 55 codes have been introduced in 19 countries (Gregory, 2002) .
Research into corporate governance systems internationally has been carried out. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) People who defend bad corporate governance on the grounds of … some cultural differences are talking nonsense. I think it is a reflection on an ownership structure that gives people the ability to abuse public shareholders and perhaps the mentality that the public is fortunate to be owning shares and providing finance for a company, but not be part-owner of the business. (p.100) As Solomon and Solomon (2004) There is no uniformity in the EU member States CG Guidelines. As Ugeux (2004) states in the last decade there have been a number of initiatives due to the fact that there is no global regulatory framework. These initiatives were the Lyons G7 meetings which looked at the possible ways to achieve some form of regulatory framework for global financial institutions and capital markets.
To date there has been little attempt to compare and contrast the various corporate governance codes of practice. The main study was carried out by the European Union (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2002 ) and a smaller scale study by Collier and Zaman (2005) who have looked at convergance of audit committees of 20 European countries. The former study presented the findings of a detailed content analysis which examined the Guidelines at the time. However, there has been a proliferation of codes of practice and best practice corporate governance guidelines throughout the European Union, since this study, as well as enlargement of the European Union membership.
The purpose of this paper however is not to compare the European corporate governance guidelines and aim to determine whether they are in line with the OECD principles. The primary aim of the paper is to utilise a corporate governance rating system to rate and rank EU countries according their best practice corporate governance guidelines. This constitutes a significant extension from the more common approach of simply comparing the corporate governance practices of individual corporations and entities (Witt, 2004 . They all differ in their respective methodologies, but all have the similar goal of trying to measure and rank entities on the basis of their corporate governance.
It needs to be acknowledged that the results of the present study will be indicative rather than conclusive. The key reason for this is that best practice guidelines are not necessarily synonymous with actual practice. To illustrate the tentative nature of the ratings based on the best practice guidelines of the various countries may differ significantly from actual to corporate practice. The secondary aim of the present paper is to provide a rich description and summary of the corporate governance guidelines of the EU countries.
Methodology
The corporate governance rating system that is used in this paper is the rating system that is used in the Australian "Horwath Corporate Governance Report" 7 . There are several rating systems that could have been used, but the decision to use the Horwath Report was based on pragmatic issues to do with cost and availability. Most (possibly all) rating systems sell data bases emanating from their rankings, but do not make their specific research design available. However, one of the authors of this paper is a principal researcher of the Horwath Report. Accordingly, he is able to make use of the research design employed in the Horwath Report to the analysis of this paper.
With the same philosophy and justification as Collier and Zaman (2005) the present authors chose to carry out a comparative analysis of the European countries since there are "countries with varying traditions of corporate governance, and second, the European Commission has been actively addressing the issue with an Action Plan aimed at delivering the integrated and modern company law and corporate governance framework which businesses, markets and the public are calling for" (EU Institutions Press Release, IP/03/716 21 May 2003).
The corporate governance guidelines of each of the EU countries were obtained from the European Corporate Governance Institute web site in July of 2004. 8 The web site as Collier and Zaman (2005) state has an academic integrity and its role is to undertake commission and disseminate research on corporate governance. The full titles and references to the Guidelines are contained in the bibliography.
The Horwath Corporate Governance Model
The specific detail of the model used to derive the ratings is proprietary information. 9 The model has been used annually since 2002 to rank Australia's largest 250 companies on the basis of their corporate 7 http://www.newcastle.edu.au/school/newcbusiness/horwath/index.html 8 http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php 9 The Horwath Report is copyright by the University of Newcastle (Australia) and is based on research by Jim Psaros (one of the authors of this paper) and Michael Seamer from the University of Newcastle's School of Business and Management. governance mechanisms. While no model could claim to cover all aspects of good governance, the Horwath Corporate Governance Model does appear to have reasonable credibility in the Australian financial press and academic community. The report, which is released annually, has been reported in all the major Australian financial press and has been the basis for ongoing academic research. Linden and Matolcsy (2004) described the Horwath Report as the "bestknown Australian corporate governance scoring system". One further indication that the Horwath Report is making a useful contribution to the corporate governance debate in Australia is the fact that it forms the basis for research papers from academics from several leading Australian universities. For example, research papers based on Horwath Report data were written by leading accounting and finance academics at several Australian universities (eg West Australia Business School, The University of New South Wales, The University of Technology Sydney, and The Melbourne Business School). Papers include Linden and Matolcsy (2004) and Beekes and Brown (2006) . No model would claim to capture all dimensions of corporate governance. Certainly the Horwath Report does not. However, it does provide a quantifiable and objective measure of corporate governance structures.
In short the Horwath model considers objective factors based on publicly disclosed information pertaining to the existence and structure of a company's Board of Directors and associated committees, the level of perceived independence of the company from the external auditors, and disclosures relating to the existence of a code of conduct, risk management and share trading policy. A brief discussion and justification of each of these factors follows.
Components Tested

Board of Directors
The Board of Directors is the ultimate decision making body of an organisation and thus plays a crucial role in many areas including corporate governance (Garratt, 1996; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Higgs Report 2003) . However, an effective board will contain ethical, skilled and critically thinking individuals who contribute special expertise to the company. Solomon (2007) suggests that a whole host of diverse factors are being recognised as influencing board effectiveness and stresses the importance of ethics in the boardroom, as an essential ingredient to 'good' corporate governance. Nicholson and Kiel (2004) conceptualise the board as a 'social phenomenon' with an effective board achieving an appropriate fit between elements of intellectual capital and board functions. They argue that the human dimension, as well as other complex factors, means that board dynamics cannot be analysed purely in an agency theory framework. Garratt (2005) suggests that future boards should be genuinely altruistic, driven by ethics and professionalism.
More specifically the Board is responsible for determining, implementing, maintaining a culture of integrity (ICGN, 2005) . The Board will also have an "appropriate" level of independence. For a listed public company there needs to be a balance between internal, non-independent "finger on the pulse" expertise, and external, independent representation (Mace, 1986; Alkhafaji, 1989) . While there is no onesize-fits-all formula for all organisations, it seems well established internationally (eg. ASX Corporate Governance Council, Australian Investment and Financial Services Association, New York Stock Exchange Governance Rules, US Blue Ribbon Report, Felton and Watson, 2006) , that there needs to be a majority of independent members and including the Chair. In addition a board needs to meet on sufficient occasions to be effective in meeting its oversight role Useem and Zelleke (2006) .
For the purposes of the Horwath model the most desirable outcome will be for a company to have:
• a board with the majority of independent directors; • an independent chairperson; and • met at least 6 times annually.
The least desirable outcome will be for a company to have:
• a board with no independent directors; • the CEO as chairperson; and • met less than 6 times annually.
Audit Committee
The importance of the audit committee to effective corporate governance has been well established in the literature for some time now (Cadbury Committee, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001). Recent research also confirms empirically some of the advantages that result from a properly constituted and independent audit committee. Abbot, Parker and Peters (2004) find that companies that have independent audit committees are less likely to be associated with restated financial statements (i.e. correcting prior year errors) and fraud, than companies that do not have independent audit committees.
An audit committee is also a crucial component of effective corporate governance. It serves to strengthen the auditor's independence by providing an independent forum where issues relating to the audit, can be referred on a timely basis. An audit committee should be in a position to discuss matters with the external and internal auditor in the absence of management and non-independent directors (Collier and Zaman, 2005 With respect to best practice on the regularity with which audit committees should meet there is less guidance. However, the Blue Ribbon Report (1999) states that "… the (audit) Committee shall meet at least four times annually, or more frequently as circumstances dictate" (p.68). Relevant to this point Abbot, Parker and Peters (2004) find that companies that had audit committees that met frequently were less likely to be associated with restated financial statements (ie. correcting prior year errors) than companies that had audit committees that did not meet frequently.
Therefore for the purposes of the model the most desirable outcome will be for a company to have:
• an audit committee with all the members, including the chair, to be independent; • a chairperson, who is not the chair of the main board; • at least one member with professional or educational accounting qualifications; • at least 3 members; and • met at least 4 times annually.
Of course, the least desirable outcome will be for a company not to have an audit committee.
Remuneration Committee
A remuneration committee is responsible for reviewing the remuneration of the directors and senior management and advising the Board whether the amounts are reasonable in comparison with industry and corporate yardsticks. A remuneration committee can be a more efficient mechanism than the full board for focusing the company on appropriate remuneration policies to enhance corporate and individual performance. The Higgs Report (2003) recommends that the Board should establish a remuneration committee; however the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council extends this and states that this committee should consist of a majority of independent directors, have an independent chairperson, and have at least three members. Whilst, Cadbury Report (1992) suggested that the Composition of the Remuneration Committee be wholly or mainly of Non-Executive Directors, Greenbury (1995) suggested that the members of the set committee be exclusively Independent NonExecutive Directors.
Consequently, for the purposes of the model the most desirable outcome will be for a company to have a remuneration committee with:
• all the members, including the chairperson, independent; • At least 3 members.
The least desirable outcome will be for a company not to have a remuneration committee.
Nomination Committee
As was the case with a remuneration committee, the Cadbury Committee, Higgs Report as well as the ASX Corporate Governance Council recommends that the Board of Directors appoint a nomination committee. A nomination committee is responsible for proposing new nominees to the Board and advising the Board on the core competencies required of new directors. An independent director should chair the nomination committee and at least a majority of the committee should be independent. Further, the nomination committee should contain at least three members. Therefore for the purposes of the model the most desirable outcome will be for a company to have a nomination committee with:
• all the members, including the chairperson, independent; • at least 3 members.
The least desirable outcome will be for a company not to have a nomination committee.
External Auditor Independence
While the empirical evidence remains mixed with respect to whether non-audit fees impact on audit judgements, there is little doubt that when the proportion of non-audit fees dwarfs the audit fee, the perception of audit independence is questioned. Whether this leads to sub-optimal judgements by the auditor is a vexed question.
Internationally, most regulators and accounting professional bodies have tread cautiously in terms of prohibiting the provision of non-audit services. In the USA the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) greatly restricts the ability of the auditor to provide non-audit services. In Australia, the Corporations Act contains some provisions which give some prominence to the need for audit independence. Notwithstanding the above arguments, it is irrefutable that the auditor needs to be beyond reproach with respect to both the reality and perception of independence. Against this backdrop, it is likely that at least the perception of independence is clouded by an audit firm providing substantial amounts of non-audit services to their client. Consequently, for the purposes of this study a weighting is placed on a limit on the proportion of non-audit fees (relative to audit fees) paid by a client to their auditor.
6.Code of Conduct and Other Policy Disclosures
A weighting is also included for disclosures relating to the existence and substance of a company's code of conduct, policy on risk management and policy on share trading. Brief discussion on each of these issues follows.
Code of Conduct -It is interesting that
Cadbury (1992) "said virtually nothing about the application of ethics and responsibility in the boardroom…despite events…such as Zeebrugge ferry disaster" which had been affected by Board decisions (Keasey et al. 2005 , p. 29). Intuitively it is to be expected that a quality organisation would engage in proper ethical behaviour at all levels of their operation. Consistent with this approach, it would also be expected that the organisation would document its policies on appropriate behaviour. Accordingly, a code of conduct is an effective way to guide the behaviour of directors and key executives and demonstrate the commitment of the company to ethical practices. Obviously the existence of a code of conduct does not guarantee ethical behaviour, but it is a start.
Policy on risk management
-Up until recent times, the general theme was that risk (and risk management) was an issue that, in an ad hoc manner, floated onto the agenda of the audit committee, the internal audit function, the external auditor function, and the main board. In essence, while all parties had a concern for risk, there wasn't always a clear understanding, in specific circumstances, of where responsibility lay. A small, but concrete way of helping to eliminate duplication and/or over-looking of risk management responsibilities is to have clear policies on risk management.
A recommendation of the ASX Corporate Governance Council requires that the board, or appropriate committee, should establish policies on risk oversight and management. Implied within this recommendation is the possibility that a specific committee (eg. Audit committee or risk management committee) may oversee the risk function of an organisation. Even if the task is not delegated to a specific committee, the minimum is that a company should clearly document their policies on risk management. This should comprise more than a blanket statement of the kind that "the board has policies in place to consider risk management".
6.3
Policy on share trading -While in most countries the law prohibits insider trading per se, there is clearly a greater moral obligation for company directors and executives when trading in company shares. Simply they should only trade in their own company's shares in specific circumstances and during specific periods. Public confidence in a company can be eroded if there is insufficient understanding about a company's policies governing trading by "potential insiders". As a minimum, companies should disclose of the trading in company securities by directors, officers and employees. While disclosure is important, it is equally important that the policy on share trading has some rigour, and ideally restricts the trading of shares to selected limited time periods when the "potential insider" is less likely (or perceived to be less likely) to have privileged information.
"Soft" Governance Measures
There are other issues that impact on corporate governance that are not included in the Horwath model. Of course corporate governance is much more than independence levels, committee structures, and other policies. In addition to the above factors there are other issues that impact on corporate governance, including the ethical and corporate culture of the organisation and the skills and characteristics of the senior management and directors (i.e. "soft measures"). These "soft" difficult to measure attributes are clearly important.
No doubt soft governance measures are an important part of the overall corporate governance framework. However, by definition there is a significant measurement problem. As it is not possible to objectively measure these factors, they are not included in the model. No model, including that used in the Horwath Report, is absent of all subjectivity. However, the authors of the Horwath Report believe that the inclusion of other softer characteristics of governance into the model would overly water down the objectivity of the model and its findings. Without discounting the importance of "soft" governance measures, it seems hard to believe that the "hard" measures as examined in the Horwath model don't add some value to good governance. If that is not the case, then all the international best practice guidelines have got it completely wrong. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to presume that in the majority of occasions, quality "hard" measures of governance will facilitate quality "soft" measures of governance. Therefore, the Horwath model used in the research only considers objective, quantifiable and publicly available information. Findings Based on the model described previously, an overall corporate governance assessment and ranking was performed for each of the 25 EU countries on the basis of their corporate governance guidelines. As noted previously in this paper, this constitutes a significant extension from the more common approach of analysing the corporate governance practices of individual corporations and entities. Quite possibly national best practice guidelines are not necessarily synonymous with individual corporate practice. In any event the results of the ranking are contained in Table  1 .
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
In aggregate the results are quite disappointing. Of the 25 EU countries, it is felt that the corporate governance guidelines of at least 13 of them are seriously lacking. In essence a one or two star rating meant that corporate governance guidelines were seriously lacking in most key areas. In particular, there appeared to be few (if any) requirements for an independent Board of Directors or any associated committees. In aggregate the corporate governance requirements were scanty in most if not all areas.
In contrast five countries (Ireland, the United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden and Slovakia) had corporate governance guidelines that could be described as "good or better". Their corporate governance guidelines were rigorous, and met best practice standards. These countries recommended independence in all key areas including the Board of Directors, audit committees, remuneration committees and nomination committees, as well as prescribing other important corporate governance policies.
Star Ratings Explanations 5 stars
(0 countries, 0%) Corporate governance guidelines were rigorous and incorporated all best practice standards. There were requirements for unequivocal independence in all key areas including the Board of Directors, audit committees, remuneration committees, and nomination committees. The Board and related committees were required to meet regularly. There was a requirement for policies with respect to the provision of non-audit services by the external auditor, risk management, share trading, and a code of conduct.
stars (2 countries, 8%)
Corporate governance guidelines were rigorous and met all best practice standards other than in relatively minor circumstances.
stars
(3 countries, 12%) Corporate governance guidelines were very good and met the vast majority of best practice standards.
stars (4 countries, 16%)
Corporate governance structures were generally good and met most of the best practice standards.
stars
(3 countries, 12%) Corporate governance guidelines were adequate and met some of the best practice standards. Most of the trimmings of good corporate governance were present but usually there was no requirement that the Board and associated committees had a majority of independent members. There were also non-trivial short-falls in some other areas.
(10 countries, 40%) Corporate governance guidelines were lacking in some key areas. There was no requirement that the Board and associated committees had a majority of independent members and there were significant corporate governance short-falls in several other areas.
star
(3 countries, 12%) Corporate governance guidelines structures were either totally lacking or inadequate in most key areas.
Descriptive Statistics
As mentioned in the methodology above the second purpose of the paper is to provide a rich description and summary of the corporate governance guidelines of the EU countries
INSERT TABLE 2
Using the SPSS package the details of each legislation were coded so as to determine a general overview of Corporate Governance Code's expectations. As stated in Table 2 the majority of the CG's in the member states are one-tier and 24% of the Guidelines state that the maximum number of board members should be sufficient whilst 28% do not make any mention of that. The number of CG Guidelines that do not mention the proportion of non-executive directors (NED) and executive directors (ED) is also alarming at 72% and 92% respectively. Regarding the number of independent non-executive directors (INED) on the Board 32% of the Guidelines state that the majority should be independent whist 92% do not state if the Chair should be INED or if he/she can be the CEO.
Regarding Audit Committees (AC) 76% of the Guidelines state that an AC should exist and 24% go as far as to state that the majority of the AC members should be INED, while only 12% of the Guidelines state that the AC Chair should be independent. A further issue regarding AC is that only 28% of the Guidelines state that AC member(s) should have some formal accounting experience.
Another issue that was looked at was the Remuneration Committee (RC), its composition and its independence. 68% of the Guidelines stated that there should be an RC, whilst only 12% stated that it should comprise 100% of INED and only 8% stated that it should be chaired by an INED.
Another limb of Corporate Governance is of course the Nomination Committee, whereby 72% of the Guidelines specifically stated that there should a NC, and 16% had gone as far as to state the majority of the members of the NC should be independent.
Other issues that were looked at were: (a) as to whether risk management committee and written policies exist (0%); written policies but not formal committee existed (16%); (b) whether the code specifies the requirement for a Code of Conduct (8%); (c) whether the Code provides a restriction on the length of director tenure (40%) and (d) whether there was a policy on share trading requirements (no requirements were found in any of the EU Guidelines).
Regarding the issue of who qualifies to be considered as an independent non-executive director there is no uniformity in the Guidelines. The UK Code is the most exhaustive in its list but the rest of the other country Guidelines need further clarification. An example is the definition of independence provided in the Combined Code 10 to that in the Greek Code
11
.
Concluding Comments and Caveats of the Research
The importance of corporate governance for all countries, but particularly for countries with an emerging economy has been well established in the literature (Doidger et al. 2004 ). While it might not appear "fair" or appropriate, many will be judged against traditional Anglo Saxon principles of corporate governance. Based on an Australian corporate governance ranking system (i.e. the Horwath Report) this paper ranks and rates EU country on the strength of their corporate governance guidelines.
In aggregate the results were disappointing, 13 of the EU countries provided corporate governance 10 Which is defined as a) not employee of the company, b) has or has had last 3yrs relationship with company, c) receives or received additional remuneration from company, d) has close families ties with any advisers or directors or employee or shareholders of the company, e) holds crossdirectorships or links other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies, f) served on the board more than 9 years, g) represents a significant shareholders, h) independent to character and judgment . 11 Which is a) not employee of the company, b) has close families ties with any advisers or directors or employee or shareholders of the company guidelines that were lacking in some key areas. Further, based on the ranking system, not one country achieved a 5 star rating for its corporate governance guidance. While the findings are interesting, care needs to be taken with their interpretation. Therefore the following caveats are noted.
First, the rating is based on the guidelines that apply in each country. In some circumstances the guidelines may exceed the practices of most (or all) entities in a particular country. As such they are held to be the "ideal" and entities will do well to follow some of the guidelines. Alternatively, in other circumstances the guidelines may be seen to be the "minimum" and actual practice will exceed it on a regular basis. Second, the legal framework or financial markets of some countries might not be not well geared to enforcement of some key governance principles. Consequently having rigorous, but not enforceable guidelines may not be that useful. Third, the rating system only considers observable and quantifiable aspects of corporate governance such as independence levels, committee structures, and other policies. In addition to the above factors there are other issues that impact on corporate governance, including the ethical and corporate culture of the organisation and the skills and characteristics of the senior management and directors (i.e. "soft measures"). These "soft" difficult to measure attributes are clearly important but are not factored into the model. Fourth, the model is based primarily on Australian measures and indices of good governance. Notwithstanding the reasonably noncontentious nature of them there is the prospect that some of them may not be suitable or appropriate for some EU countries.
It is obvious however, that the EU must either move towards harmonizing the CG Guidelines like it has done with the IFRs and is in the process of doing with the auditing standards or it should implement a regulatory body to enforce and ensure better CG Guidelines are in place in emerging economies. As demonstrated in this paper some countries have major deficiencies in their CG Guidelines which in turn could jeopardise investor confidence. 
